SCEF DOC. NO. 2	No. 14-M57
	IN THE
	Supreme Court of the United States, rame Court, U
	SENECA COUNTY, NEW YORK,
	Petitioner,
*	v.
	CAYUGA INDIAN NATION OF NEW YORK,
The second	Respondent.
	ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
	FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI OUT OF TIME AND PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
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Petitioner hereby petitions by its undersigned counsel for leave to file a petition for writ of certiorari out of time. The underlying petition for the writ of certiorari is set forth immediately below this motion.

1. Petitioner seeks the requested relief in order to have the Court accept the petition which is out of time by seven business days. The per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirming the order of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, and the corresponding judgment, were filed on July 31, 2014.

2. On August 26, 2014, petitioner directed the undersigned counsel to prepare a petition for a writ of certiorari.

3. Immediately thereafter counsel began to prepare the petition for the writ and also sought to confirm the applicable deadline for filing that petition in this Court. However, as detailed below, the 90 day period for determining when the petition would be due was measured from August 21, 2014, the date of the filing of the judgment mandate, and not from July 31, 2014, the date of the decision and judgment.

4. Counsel's reliance on the date of August 21, 2014 as the start of the 90 day period is based upon the following. On September 3, 2014, we contacted an experienced, wellrespected appellate printer, and specifically the director of that printer's United States Supreme Court division. That director is an attorney who is admitted before this Court, specializes exclusively in Supreme Court practice and has assisted us in the past with certiorari submissions to

appended to it); the judgment mandate of August 21, 2014; of the Court of Appeals (including the notice of decision for the appendix, we forwarded the July 31, 2014 opinion of the director's experience in this area as well as our prior and the decision of the United States District Court for this Court. Pursuant to his request for materials needed statement on the due date. petition for a writ of certiorari and accepted the director's did a non-exhaustive review of the timing rules for filing a dealings with the director, on September 9, 2014, counsel advised that our due date was November 19, 2014. Mindful the Western District of New York. for filing the petition for a writ of certiorari. who repeated that November 19, 2014 was the due date appellate printer the \$300 filing fee for this Court director again confirmed to us that November 19, 2014 was the filing date. days earlier, on October 29, 2014. The period of 90 days from July 31, 2014 had expired five day period began on July 31, 2014, and not August 21, 2014 in this case. Doing so led counsel to conclude that the 90 cause to re-examine the calculation of the 90 day period 5 œ -7 9 By return email on September 3, the director In an exchange of emails on October 24, 2014, the On September 11, 2014 we spoke with the director On September 10, 2014, we forwarded to the On the evening of November 4, 2014, counsel had to file out of time its petition for a writ of certiorari. as possible, together with the minimal passage of and diligent response to effect this filing as promptly the foregoing, however, including counsel's immediate November 7, 2014, petitioner respectfully requests leave time between October 29, 2014 and the actual filing on requested relief. minimal delay should not be the basis for denying the circumstances and in the interests of justice, such a That day is seven business days after October 29, 2014. It is respectfully submitted that, in these extraordinary of review by this Court. presented here are meritorious, compelling and deserving following petition for writ of certiorari, the legal issues further respectfully submitted that, as detailed in the promptly and with diligence in addressing and attempting and file the petition as quickly as possible. to remedy the situation upon learning of the same. It is November 4, counsel has worked assiduously to complete 12. This application is filed on November 7, 2014. 13. Counsel regrets this out of time filing. Based on 11. It is respectfully submitted that counsel acted 10. Since discovering the foregoing on the evening of

Respectfully submitted,

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Attorneys for Petitioner

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

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Whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Seneca County, 761 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2014) properly determined that tribal sovereign immunity from suit bars taxing authorities from foreclosing certain real property owned by the tribe to collect lawfully imposed but unpaid property taxes.

LIST OF PARTIES

Second Circuit at the request of the court. The United States appeared as amicus curiae in the curiae in the Second Circuit in support of the Counties. All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. The State of New York appeared as amicus

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Pane
QUE	QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
LIST	LIST OF PARTIES ii
ľABI	IABLE OF CONTENTS. iii
[ABI	IABLE OF APPENDICES
ľABI	CITED AUTHORITIES
OPIN	DPINIONS BELOW1
IURI	IURISDICTION
STAT	STATEMENT OF THE CASE
REAS	REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION3
I.	THE NEED TO CLARIFY FEDERAL INDIAN LAW CONCERNING TRIBAL IMMUNITY FROM FORECLOSURE
II.	THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S DECISION CONFLICTS WITH

<u>в</u>

The Decision Conflicts with Yakima.....5

A

The Decision Conflicts with Sherrill....

ċ

THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS

* * * * * *

: .5

2:

Table	
of Contents	

IV.	III.				
TH ISS CA SIG	TH SOV	E.	D.	Ω	
THE TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES PRESENTED IN THIS CASE ARE OF NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE AND RECURRING	III. THIS COURT SHOULD REVISIT THE DOCTRINE OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY	Bay Mills Is Inapposite10	Kiowa Is Inapposite9	Potawatomi Is Inapposite	Page

CONCLUSION

PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE.....13

TABLE OF APPENDICES

3

APPENDIX A -- OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT, FILED

JULY 31, 2014

.....la

iv

Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty,	131 S. Ct. 459 (2010)	County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992) passim Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998)	City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 544 U.S. 197 (2005) passim	Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Seneca County, 761 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2014) passim	Cass County v. Leech Lake Bånd of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103 (1998)12	Cases	vi
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	Inc., 2,	· · · pa	ians,	ounty v. ch Lake Bånd of Chippewa Indians, U.S. 103 (1998)	5		

may be lawfully imposed on lands owned by Native Notwithstanding tribal sovereign immunity, taxes

York ("Seneca County") on grounds of tribal sovereign failure to pay lawfully imposed property taxes Cayuga Indian Nation ("CIN") in response to CIN's immunity from foreclosing certain lands owned by the The decision below enjoined Seneca County, New

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

New York) was invoked under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1362. United States District Court for the Western District of U.S.C. § 1254(1).

The jurisdiction of the court of first instance (i.e., the

rehearing was filed in this case. decided this case was July 31, 2014. No petition for The date on which the United States Court of Appeals 240 (W.D.N.Y. 2012).

appears at App. to _ and is reported at 890 F. Supp. 2d

JURISDICTION

The opinion of the United States District Court

("Seneca"), appears in the Appendix, App. _ to _ and is reported at 761 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2014).

Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Seneca County

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals,

OPINIONS BELOW

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28

Circuit's own recognition of the internal contradiction in hour was a tactical move is buttressed by the Second the Oneida Indian Nation ("OIN") strategically waived opportunity to settle the question in Madison because (2011). That OIN's waiver of its immunity at the eleventh Madison County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 131 S. Ct. 704 the merits, necessitating a vacation and remand. See, its sovereign immunity before the Court could decide v. Mfg. Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998) ("Kiowa"). of this Court's prior decisions in Okla. Tax Comm'n v. concluded that this holding was mandated by its reading U.S. 505 (1991) ("Potawatomi") and Kiowa Tribe of Okla. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 immunity. The Second Circuit in Madison reluctantly taxes through foreclosure due to the tribes' sovereign real property taxes on certain lands owned by Native American tribes, those authorities may not collect the that although taxing authorities may lawfully impose Madison County, 605 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2010) ("Madison") to address this anomaly when it granted certiorari in Circuit's holding in Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. (2010). There, the Court was poised to review the Second Madison County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 131 S. Ct. 459 upon their lands. confusion and misinterpretation of this Court's precedent, Native American tribes fail to pay taxes lawfully imposed taxing authorities are currently without any remedy when City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 544 American tribes consistent with this Court's holding in U.S. 197 (2005) ("Sherrill"). However, due to widespread However, this Court was ultimately denied the It is respectfully submitted that this Court sought

its *Madison* holding. Two judges of the *Madison* court acknowledged that their holding "defies common sense" and is "so anomalous that it calls out for the Supreme Court to revisit *Kiowa* and *Potawatomi*." 605 F.3d at 164. (Circuit Judges Cabranes and Hall, concurring). The third member of the panel, writing for the court, illustrated the self-contradiction of the holding by quoting a nonsense nursery rhyme¹. *Id.* at 159.

Many of the arguments that follow appear in the petition for certiorari in *Madison* because the issues raised herein are virtually identical, and Seneca County gratefully acknowledges the contributions of prior petitioners' submissions. This case presents the Court with another opportunity to finally settle the question of what, if any, recourse taxing authorities have when Native American tribes fail to pay taxes lawfully assessed against real property owned by the tribes.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The Second Circuit's decision below erroneously applied this Court's precedents concerning Native American tribal sovereign immunity with respect to *in personam* actions against a tribe to the categorically distinct setting of *in rem* foreclosure proceedings to collect real property taxes. The Second Circuit did so in a manner that, at best clashes with, and at worst, affirmatively contradicts *Sherrill*, and that begs for this Court to revisit the doctrine of tribal immunity from suit.

And don't go near the water."

N

 [&]quot;Mother, may I go out to swim? Yes, my darling daughter; Hang your clothes on a hickory limb.

The issues presented in this case are of national significance and recurring practical importance. The Second Circuit's decision in *Seneca* that tribal sovereign immunity bars foreclosure on taxable lands purchased by Native American tribes, no less than its similar decision in *Madison*, will enable and encourage the disruptive impracticalities, inefficiencies and serious burdens on the administration of state and local governments that troubled this Court in *Sherrill*. 544 U.S. at 219-220.

Although this Court just recently opined on tribal sovereign immunity in *Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty.*, 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014) ("*Bay Mills*"), this Court should again address tribal sovereign immunity because *Bay Mills* did not address the Question Presented herein of tribal sovereign immunity as it relates to the distinction between *in personam* and *in rem* jurisdiction.

I. THE NEED TO CLARIFY FEDERAL INDIAN LAW CONCERNING TRIBAL IMMUNITY FROM FORECLOSURE.

This Court should clarify whether the holding in Sherrill prevents Native American tribes from defensively invoking sovereign immunity when their land is threatened with foreclosure because the tribe refuses to pay lawfully owed taxes. To the extent Sherrill decided that question directly, as Seneca County maintained below, law and logic are in harmony and thus the Second Circuit's Seneca decision directly conflicts with Sherrill. Accordingly, this Court should grant this petition to correct the clear error of law below.

> To the extent *Sherrill* can be read to be either silent or ambiguous on the precise question of whether tribal immunity from suit is a defense to foreclosure to collect lawfully imposed property taxes, this Court should grant this petition to clarify how, if at all, the doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit applies in this frequently occurring scenario. The Second Circuit in *Madison* was sympathetic that the rule adopted in that case and applied in this case—that local and state authorities may tax but not foreclose—"is inconsistent and contradictory." 605 F.3d at 159.

II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S DECISION CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS.

The Decision Conflicts with Sherrill.

Sherrill unequivocally held that Native American tribes are barred from exercising sovereignty—in whole or in part—over previously owned parcels repurchased on the open market in fee simple, when the "embers of [tribal] sovereignty . . . [had] long ago [grown] cold" with respect to the parcels. 544 U.S. at 214. Thus, *Sherrill* stands for the proposition that land acquired by a tribe in the modern era in fee simple is subject to the full jurisdiction and taxing authority of local governments. Following *Sherrill*, no valid distinction can be drawn between the authorities' right to tax the land and their right to enforce those taxes through foreclosure and eviction. *Id.* at 214, n.7.

B. The Decision Conflicts with Yakima.

In County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251(1992)

2. In Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) ("Moe"), this Court rejected a construction of the General Allotment Act, urged by effect." Id. at 264. This argument did not concern the and in personam jurisdiction: Second Circuit here failed to recognize) between in rem create an "impracticable, Moe²-condemned 'checkerboard' of alienable lands within the Yakima reservation would Court in Yakima because it drew a distinction (which the arguments that the resulting parcel-by-parcel taxation assessment and forced sale for taxes." Id. at 263-64. This and foreclose on the tribal lands in question, observing commenced in rem tax foreclosure proceedings. Id. at 256 Court rejected the Yakima Nation's and United States' that the alienability of the lands "rendered them subject to to pay the assessed property taxes, Yakima County members of the tribe. When the Yakima Nation refused were owned by the Yakima Nation and others by individual ad valorem property taxes on the lands, some of which within the tribe's reservation. Yakima County assessed in fee simple. 502 U.S. at 270. state taxing authority is empowered to collect ad valorem real property taxes. Specifically, this Court held that a if those taxes were lawfully imposed on tribal lands held property taxes through in rem foreclosure proceedings attempt to foreclose tribal land in response to unpaid ("Yakima"), this Court upheld a local government's This Court confirmed Yakima County's right to tax The lands in question in Yakima were alienable lands

Act) but also subsequent Indian owners of the allotted parcels. personam jurisdiction to not only allottees (covered by § 6 of the the State of Montana, that would have extended the state's in

> condemned; and it is not impracticable either." than in personam, it is assuredly not Moe-"[B]ecause the jurisdiction is in rem rather *Id.* at 265.

-7

administrative problems." 502 U.S. at 262 (citing Moe upon his parcel ownership, producing "almost surrea any given Native American must defer would depend "checkerboard" pattern in which the sovereign to which of state jurisdiction in Moe would have created a The Yakima Court recognized that such an assertion 425 U.S. at 478-479).

to assess and collect a tax on certain real estate is not." disruptive of tribal self-government, "the mere power Yakima, 502 U.S. at 265. Indians at issue in *Moe* would have been significantly Although the in personam jurisdiction over reservation

been raised. actions when a tribal sovereign immunity defense has distinction between in personam actions and in rem the nuances of this Court's treatment in Yakima of the is no doubt that the Second Circuit in Seneca overlooked on the annual date of assessment." Id. at 266. Thus, there valorem taxes flows exclusively from ownership of realty property alone," such that the "[l]iability for the ad of ad valorem property taxes "creates a burden on the This Court made clear in Yakima that the assessment

Accordingly, this Court's precedent is clear that taxing authorities have the right, under *Sherrill* and assessed on tribal lands held in fee simple, and that tribal Yakima, to impose and collect real property taxes

sovereign immunity is not a defense to a tax foreclosure action against taxable parcels of tribal lands.

C. Potawatomi Is Inapposite

right to tax those sales. Id. at 507, 512-13. tribe at the store, even though Oklahoma had a lawful obligations for sales of cigarettes to nonmembers of the Court rejected the Oklahoma taxing authority's attempt not true of the parcels at issue in Sherrill and here) this the tribe's undeniable sovereignty over the land (which is sovereignty over that land. 498 U.S. at 508, 511. In light of to sue the tribe to enforce the tribe's sales tax collection federal trust lands, and acknowledged the tribe exercised observed that the tribal store in question was located on proceedings to collect real property taxes assessed on address tribal immunity as it relates to in rem foreclosure taxable tribal lands. Instead, the Court in Potawatomi respect to the collection of sales taxes on Indian lands." sought to "clarif[y] the law of sovereign immunity with Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991), this Court However, the Court in Potawatomi did not purport to In Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi

The Court specifically noted that the State of Oklahoma was not left without a remedy because it could collect the sales tax from the wholesale distributor, and because the State could sue individual members of the tribe who violated Oklahoma law with respect to collecting sales taxes on cigarettes sold at the store. *Id.* at 514. In stark contrast, the Second Circuit's reading of *Sherrill* in its *Madison* and *Seneca* decisions, completely strips the local and state taxing authorities of any meaningful remedy for nonpayment of real property taxes.

> Potawatomi simply does not diminish the Yakima rule that in rem proceedings to collect property taxes do not violate tribal sovereignty because it is not "significantly disruptive of tribal self-government." Yakima, 502 U.S. at 265. Interestingly, the Court in Yakima did not rely on Potawatomi even though both the Yakima Nation and the United States cited Potawatomi in their briefs. This Court appeared to recognize in Yakima that the principle articulated in Potawatomi was not on point in the context of in rem foreclosure proceedings to collect property taxes.

Accordingly, this Court's decision in *Potawatomi* does not address whether taxing authorities have the right, under *Sherrill* and *Yakima*, to impose and collect real property taxes assessed on Indian-owned land held in fee simple because tribal sovereign immunity erects no bar to *in rem* foreclosure proceedings.

D. Kiowa Is Inapposite

Although the Second Circuit in *Seneca* claimed to be following *Kiowa*, that case is not on point. *Kiowa* did not involve state taxation or any regulatory action. Rather, *Kiowa* involved an *in personam* breach of contract action against the tribe, brought by a private party. *Kiowa*, 523 U.S. at 754. This Court concluded that the *in personam* action was barred by the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. *Id.* at 760. Although the Court mentioned that "there are reasons to doubt the wisdom of perpetuating the [tribal immunity] doctrine," *id.* at 758, the Court articulated that it felt compelled to adhere to it *in personam* actions because Congress had not dispensed with it. *Id.* at 759-60. The Court, however, did not imply 00

rem foreclosure proceedings to collect real property taxes anything at all about tribal immunity with respect to in such as denying a license to the tribe for an off-reservation III. THIS COURTSHOULD REVISITTHE DOCTRINE assessed on lands indisputably subject to taxation. casino, and had to rely on those options. Id. at 2028, 2035 regulating operations at off-reservation Indian casinos The Court in Bay Mills did not purport to determine of IGRA occurring on reservation land. Id. at 2033-34. The Court concluded that states have other options for IGRA only permitted tribes to be sued for violations Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2028. This Court concluded that tribes' operations of casinos on off-reservation land. authorities from suing Native American tribes to enjoin § 2701 et seq., tribal sovereign immunity barred local the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"), 25 U.S.C. said nothing to support the notion that a state sovereign taxes that are due. is powerless to collect legitimately imposed real property at all that it was overruling or restricting Yakima, and Many Indian tribes are engaged in casino gambling OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ē This Court in Bay Mills clarified that pursuant to **Bay Mills** Is Inapposite. to foster.

plots of off-reservation real property on which to establish and entail the tribes acquiring on the open market large and other business enterprises that generate great wealth or expand these business enterprises

11

activities and historical developments have completely ripe for abrogation or restriction given that modern tribal stand for that proposition." Id. at 756. The doctrine is now by accident" and derives from a case that "simply does not doctrine of tribal immunity from suit "developed almost wide-ranging tribal enterprises extending well beyond traditional tribal customs and activities." Kiowa, 523 rationale "can be challenged as inapposite to modern, governance. It is not a new argument that the doctrine's balance between tribal sovereignty and efficient local this Court should revisit the judicially-created doctrine tribes and the assertion of tribal immunity from suit local governments the doctrine was originally designed disrupted the equilibrium between Indian nations and of tribal sovereignty from suit in order to restore the in settings that do not implicate tribal self-governance, U.S. at 757-58. As this Court observed in Kiowa, the Given the expansion of commercial activities by

as the tribe would argue: sovereign immunity does not and cannot stretch as far pertinent reductio ad absurdum analogy, why tribal in part on Sherrill to demonstrate, by means of a very sovereign immunity. Id. at 920-21. The district court in assessing land it acquired on the open market by invoking prevent state and local governments from condemning or v. Vill. of Hobart, 542 F. Supp. 2d 908 (E.D. Wis. 2008). regulatory action can be found in Oneida Tribe of Indians of sovereign immunity from state and local laws and Village of Hobart rejected the tribe's argument relying In that case, the Oneida Tribe of Indians attempted to A relatively recent example of a tribe's assertion

controls that protect all landowners in the area."); *see also id.* at 220, n.13.

13

If Sherrill does not provide the answer to the abuses of tribal immunity that are occurring more and more frequently, then the best alternative answer is for this Court to take this opportunity to abrogate or curtail the loctrine of tribal immunity from suit. By eliminating or restricting that judicially-created doctrine, this Court could restore the ability of state and local authorities to seek judicial relief when tribes take actions that violate the law, disrupt the administration of state and local government, and threaten neighboring landowners. It is respectfully submitted that, as shown by the events in his case and *Village of Hobart*, absolute tribal sovereign mmunity from suit "defies common sense."

V. THE TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES PRESENTED IN THIS CASE ARE OF NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE AND RECURRING PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE.

The issue of tribal sovereign immunity from suit has risen in states from coast to coast in this nation, and in arious contexts. The Second Circuit's *Seneca* decision nly briefly addressed the doctrine in the context of *in rem* ax foreclosure, and refused to recognize any difference 1 the application of the doctrine between *in rem* and *in ersonam* actions, instead urging this Court to examine he issue. *See, Seneca County*, 761 F.3d at 221 ("[W]e ecline to draw the novel distinctions—such as a distinction etween *in rem* and *in personam* proceedings—that eneca County has urged us to adopt.").

As stated previously, many Native American tribes are engaged in casino gambling and other business enterprises that enable tribes to purchase large amounts of land in fee simple on the open market. Judge Cabranes' concurring opinion in *Madison* can be applied to any land Circuit's holding in *Madison* can be applied to any land purchased by an Indian tribe, "including land that was never part of a reservation." 605 F.3d at 163. Accordingly, the "anomalous" result in this case, in which the Second Circuit held tribal sovereign immunity prevented taxing authorities from foreclosing to collect real property taxes, has national implications.

Under the current state of the law, tribes can plausibly cite the Second Circuit *Madison* and *Seneca* decisions to assert tribal immunity as a defense not just to foreclosure proceedings to collect real property taxes but also against enforcement of zoning, environmental and other regulatory laws, all beyond the borders of any existing or ancient reservation.

The lives and wellbeing of citizens across this country who live near tribal lands, and the efficient administration of local governments situated near tribal lands, will continue to suffer and be disrupted if the Second Circuit's *Seneca* decision, which effectively gives tribes free rein to refuse to pay lawfully imposed property taxes and take actions in violation of state and local law, is not reviewed by this Court.


CONCLUSION


For the foregoing reasons, there exist important issues of federal law that need to be determined by this Court and the petition for a writ of *certiorari* should therefore be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

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Attorneys for Petitioner





STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND APPENDIX A - OPINION OF THE UNITED CIRCUIT, FILED JULY 31, 2014

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Docket No. 12-3723

CAYUGA INDIAN NATION OF NEW YORK,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

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SENECA COUNTY, NEW YORK,

enjoined defendant-appellant Seneca County, New York

from foreclosing upon certain real property owned by

States District Court for the Western District of New York

We are called upon to review an order of the United

(Charles J. Siragusa, *District Judge*), which preliminarily

PER CURIAM:

Before: KATZMANN, Chief Judge, JACOBS and

OPINION

Argued January 7, 2014 Decided July 31, 2014

Defendant-Appellant.

CARNEY, Circuit Judges.

Appendix A

plaintiff-appellee the Cayuga Indian Nation of New York ("Cayuga Nation").

Our standard of review of a district court's decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is well established, as are the general requirements placed upon a party seeking a preliminary injunction. *See Oneida Nation of N.Y. v. Cuomo*, 645 F.3d 154, 164 (2d Cir. 2011). The only issue in dispute in this appeal is whether the district court properly determined that the Cayuga Nation was likely underlying the district court's decision *de novo* and the district court's factual determinations for clear error. *See id.*

Seneca County initiated foreclosure proceedings against certain of the Cayuga Nation's real property in an attempt to recover uncollected *ad valorem* property taxes. After invoking the doctrine of tribal sovereign *Nation of N.Y. v. Madison County*, 605 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2010), *vacated*, 131 S. Ct. 704, 178 L. Ed. 2d 587 (2011), the district court preliminarily enjoined the County's oreclosure proceedings. Seneca County timely appealed he doctrine of tribal immunity from suit so as to permit tates to bring foreclosure suits to recover uncollected axes levied against the property of Indian tribes.

Seneca County acknowledges that our opinion in *Iadison County* squarely addressed the question resented here and held that tribal sovereign immunity

3a

Appendix A

from suit bars these foreclosure actions, *see* 605 F.3d at 156-60, but the County emphasizes that the Supreme Court's decision to vacate our opinion leaves this panel free from otherwise binding precedent and urges us to conclude that *Madison County* misconstrued Supreme Court precedent regarding the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. The State of New York, appearing as *amicus curriae*, further contends that the vacatur of our prior opinion casts substantial doubt on the correctness of the reasoning of *Madison County*.

avowedly "broad principle," id. at 2031, and the Supreme congressional authorization (or a waiver)," id. at 2031. This 31 (quoting Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756, 118 S. Ct. 1700, 140 L. Ed. 2d 981 (1998)), treatment of tribal sovereign immunity from suit is an courts must "dismiss[] any suit against a tribe absent Ed. 2d 881 (1986)). Under this "settled law," id. at 2030-World Eng'g, P.C., 476 U.S. 877, 890, 106 S. Ct. 2305, 90 L. Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. a common-law immunity from suit. Id. at 2030 (quoting corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance," Court once again held that tribes retain, as "a necessary sweep of that immunity in the absence of express action by 134 S. Ct. 2024, 188 L. Ed. 2d 1071 (2014), the Supreme Congress. In Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, of drawing distinctions that might constrain the broad regarding both the continuing vitality of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity from suit and the propriety the Supreme Court has since issued further guidance communicated by the vacatur of our prior opinion because We need not attempt to discern the implied message 2a

Appendix A

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Court (like this Court) has "thought it improper suddenly to start carving out exceptions" to that immunity, opting instead to "defer" to the plenary power of Congress to define and otherwise abrogate tribal sovereign immunity from suit, *id.* (quoting *Kiowa*, 523 U.S. at 758).

Therefore we decline, as has the Supreme Court, to read a "commercial activity" exception into the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity from suit, *see id.*; *Kiowa*, 523 U.S. at 758, and we decline to draw the novel distinctions—such as a distinction between *in rem* and *in personam* proceedings—that Seneca County has urged us to adopt, *see Bay Mills*, 134 S. Ct. at 2031; *see also The Siren*, 74 U.S. 152, 154, 19 L. Ed. 129 (1868) ("[T]here is no listinction between suits against the government directly, and suits against its property.").

Notwithstanding Seneca County and the State of New York's vigorous argument, we read no implied abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity from suit into *City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y.*, 544 U.S. 197, 125 S. Ct. 1478, 161 L. Ed. 2d 386 (2005), or *County yf Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima indian Nation*, 502 U.S. 251, 112 S. Ct. 683, 116 L. Ed. 2d 687 (1992). Such implied abrogation would be clearly to odds with the Supreme Court's solicitous treatment of he common-law tribal immunity from suit—as opposed o immunity from other, largely prescriptive, powers if the states such as the levying of taxes. *See Madison Jounty*, 605 F.3d at 156-59. And implied abrogation would lso run counter to the principle that we must "defer' to Jongress about whether to abrogate tribal [sovereign]

Appendix A

immunity," *Bay Mills*, 134 S. Ct. at 2031 (quoting *Kiowa*, 523 U.S. at 758).

In short, in the absence of a waiver of immunity by the tribe, "[u]nless Congress has authorized [the] suit, ... precedents demand," *id.* at 2032, that we affirm the district court's injunction of the County's foreclosure proceedings against the Cayuga Nation's property.¹

Accordingly, the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.

at 30-32. "[T]o relinquish its immunity, a tribe's waiver must be estopped from asserting the defense based on the Nation's expression by the Cayuga Nation that it has waived its immunity Ct. 1670, 56 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1978) (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399, 96 S. Ct. 948, 47 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1976)). None Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 418, 121 S. Ct. 1589, 149 L. Ed. 2d 623 233, 904 N.Y.S.2d 312 (N.Y. 2010). See Br. of Defendant-Appellant arguments before the New York Court of Appeals in Cayuga has either waived sovereign immunity or should be otherwise from suit with respect to the parcels in question. of the statements cited by the County represents an unequivocal expressed," Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58, 98 S (1991)), and thus it "cannot be implied but must be unequivocally *Tribe of Okla.*, 498 U.S. 505, 509, 111 S. Ct. 905, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1112 (2001) (quoting Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi 'clear,'" C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Indian Nation of New York v. Gould, 14 N.Y.3d 614, 930 N.E.2d 1. Seneca County also contends that the Cayuga Nation

Vereign immunity. (Docket No. 4). For the reasons that	younty ("Defendant") may foreclose on real property wned by the Cayuga Indian Nation of New York 'Plaintiff") for failure to pay <i>ad valorem</i> property axes. Now before the Court is Plaintiff's application for reliminary injunctive relief, enjoining Defendant from areclosing on the subject parcels, on the grounds of tribal	INTRODUCTION This action presents the question whather grant	DECISION AND ORDER	Defendant.	SENECA COUNTY, NEW YORK,	-V-	Plaintiff	CAYUGA INDIAN NATION OF NEW YORK,	11-CV-6004 CJS	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, FILED AUGUST 20, 2012	APPENDIX B — DECISION AND ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN		
1. The Amended Complaint indicates that ther parcels. Amended Complaint [#9] at ¶ 7. However. ar	The subject action involves five ¹ such pa property located in Seneca County, which were o included in the Reservation, but which were la to third parties, and then re-purchased by I Defendant has attempted to collect <i>ad valorem</i>]	now Reservation land and are "Indian Country the meaning of federal law. <i>See</i> , Amended Compl at ¶¶7-10. Defendant again disagrees.	that lie within the geographic area of the aforem Reservation. Plaintiff contends that such prope	Reservation land to the State of New York, began purchasing parcels of property on the ope	Approximately two centuries after selling	Cayuga Reservation remains intact to this day. <i>L</i> Complaint [#9] at ¶ 10. Defendant disagrees.	requirements of the Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S. Plaintiff contends, therefore, that the entire 64,	State of New York. Plaintiff maintains that such s illegal and void <i>ab initio</i> , since they did not comply	Canandaigua in 1794. Shortly after 1794, the Nation sold large portions of the Reservation large portions of the deservation large portions of	Plaintiff is a federally-recognized Indian Tr owns real property in Seneca County. The subjection involves land that was formerly part of the 64 Cayuga Reservation acknowledged by the T	BACKGROUND	Appendix B	7a	

ly with the S.C. § 177. e Cayuga unds to the l,000-acre Amended ribe which ect dispute Treaty of ales were ,000-acre

ng off the Plaintiff en market laint [#9] y" within rties are lentioned

originally later sold Plaintiff. property

properties. Alcott Aff. [#6] at ¶ 3. ere are five an affidavit re are four

Complaint indicates that under New York State law, "an Indian tribe's property [is exempt] from taxation if located within an Indian reservation." Amended Complaint [#9] at ¶ 1 (emphasis added); see also, id. at ¶ 21 (citing New York Real Property Tax Law § 454).	2. Plaintiff maintains that in this action it is not claiming that the property is "immune from taxation." Pl. Reply Memo are immune from taxation does not claim the parcels at issue here added). Instead, Plaintiff contends that while the County may impose taxes, it has no right to collect them. <i>Id.</i> ("It is well- sovereign immunity from suit may bar a state from resorting to a	owed. ² In that regard, Plaintiff relies, in large part, on the Second Circuit's decision in Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. Madison County and Oneida County, 605 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2010) ("Oneida").	is entitled to injunctive relief because the foreclosure actions are barred by sovereign immunity. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that "[a]s a federally-recognized Indian nation, [it] possess[es] tribal sovereign immunity [from suit], which bars administrative and judicial proceedings against the [Indian] Nation " over it to be the proceedings	On January 5, 2011, Plaintiff commenced this action, seeking permanent declaratory and injunctive relief. At the same time, Plaintiff made the subject application for preliminary injunctive relief, enjoining the County from foreclosing on the properties. Plaintiff contends that it	taxes on the parcels, and Plaintiff has denied any obligation to pay them. As a result, Defendant initiated foreclosure proceedings, pursuant to Article Eleven of the New York State Real Property Tax Law.	Appendix B	8a
3. Defendant also maintains that the subject foreclosure actions are not barred by the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834, also known as the Non-Intercourse Act. Plaintiff had argued, in its moving papers, that the foreclosure actions violated the Non- Intercourse Act, which prompted Defendant to devote a large part	1478, 161 L. Ed. 2d 386 (2005) (" <i>Sherrill</i> "). According to Defendant, <i>Yakima</i> established that tribal sovereign immunity does not bar <i>in rem</i> property tax foreclosure proceedings against property owned by an Indian tribe, while <i>Sherrill</i> held that an Indian tribe cannot revive its sovereign authority over land by purchasing it after years of inaction. ³	Court precedent, most notably County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 112 S.Ct. 683, 116 L. Ed. 2d 687 (1992) ("Yakima") and and City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York. 544 U.S. 197. 125 S.Ct.	nied, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Second Circuit's <i>Oneida</i> decision, and argues that such decision now "has no precedential value whatsoever." Spellane Aff. [#12-1] at 2. Defendant contends, <i>inter</i> <i>alia</i> , that the Second Circuit's opinion was incorrectly decided in any event, since it was contrary to Supreme	schedule, thereby mooting the request for an expedited hearing. On February 3, 2011, Defendant filed opposing papers. Defendant observes that after Plaintiff's application was	The Court granted Plaintiff's request for an expedited hearing, and scheduled the matter to be heard on January 13, 2011. However, the parties agreed to stay the foreclosure proceedings, and stipulated to a briefing	Appendix B	9a

the Court need not address the Non-Intercourse Act at this time. motion, without regard to the Non-Intercourse Act). Accordingly, sovereign immunity provides a sufficient basis for granting the Pl. Reply Memo of Law [#21] at p. 2, n. 2 (Indicating that tribal on the Non-Intercourse Act as a basis for the subject motion. See, at pp. 19-33. However, Plaintiff's reply brief disclaims reliance of its responding brief to that issue. See, Def. Memo of Law [#12] have the right to collect those taxes by suing to foreclose parcels owned by the Cayuga Indian Nation, it does not has the right to impose property taxes on the subject and holds as follows: Even assuming that Seneca County precedent clearly determines the outcome of this motion, to the Second Circuit's Oneida decision, Supreme Court the state court proceedings. therefore disagree as to whether the Court should enjoin dispute whether tribal sovereign immunity applies, and or to protect or effectuate its judgments."). The parties proceedings "where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."); see also, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (A federal court may grant an injunction to stay state court "may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (Providing that federal courts tax foreclosure proceeding, pursuant to the All-Writs before the undersigned for oral argument. A lengthy discussion is unnecessary, since, according Plaintiff seeks an injunction enjoining the state-court On May 5, 2011, counsel for the parties appeared DISCUSSION

> on the properties, unless Congress authorizes it to do so, or unless the Cayuga Indian Nation waives its sovereign immunity from suit. Congress has not authorized Seneca County to sue the Cayugas, and the Cayugas have not waived their sovereign immunity. Consequently, the Cayugas' motion for an order enjoining the foreclosure actions must be granted.

The cases upon which the foregoing paragraph rests are well-known to the litigants and to the courts that will undoubtedly be called upon to review this Court's ruling. For the benefit of anyone reading this decision who is not familiar with them, and who may be understandably perplexed by this ruling, the Court will briefly review the controlling law.

In Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 118 S. Ct. 1700, 1702, 140 L. Ed. 2d 981 (1998), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the federal common law doctrine that Indian tribes cannot be sued unless Congress authorizes the suit or unless the tribes waive their immunity. Significantly, the Supreme Court held that even if a state has the authority to tax or otherwise regulate an Indian tribe in a particular instance, it does not have the ability to sue the tribe to enforce the tax or regulation, unless Congress authorizes the suit, or unless the tribe waives its sovereign immunity:

As a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity....Our cases allowing States to apply

11a

Appendix B

Appendix B

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In <i>Sherrill</i> , the Supreme Court rejected the Oneida Indian Nation's claim to have sovereign authority, in the form of exemption from property taxation, over real	any changes in that regard. <i>Id.</i> , 118 S.Ct. at 1704-1705 ("The capacity of the Legislative Branch to address the issue by comprehensive legislation counsels some caution by us in this area [W]e decline to revisit our case law and choose to defer to Congress."). To date, Congress has declined that invitation.	<i>Id.</i> , 118 S.Ct. at 1702-1703 (emphasis added, citations omitted). In doing so, the Supreme Court questioned "the wisdom of perpetuating the doctrine" of Tribal sovereign immunity, but deferred to Congress to make	their substantive laws to tribal activities are not to the contrary. We have recognized that a State may have authority to tax or regulate tribal activities occurring within the State but outside Indian country. To say substantive state laws apply to off-reservation conduct, however, is not to say that a tribe no longer enjoys immunity from suit. In [Oklahoma Tax Commin v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 111 S.Ct. 905, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1112 (1991)], for example, we reaffirmed that while Oklahoma may tax cigarette sales by a Tribe's store to nonmembers, the Tribe enjoys immunity from a suit to collect unpaid state taxes. There is a difference between the right to demand compliance with state laws and the means available to enforce them.	12a Annondin D
4. The Supreme Court observed, however, that the Oneidas could seek to have the land taken into federal trust, and thus exempted from State and local taxation, pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 465. <i>Id.</i> , 125 S.Ct. at 1495 ("Section 465 provides the proper avenue for [the Oneidas] to reestablish sovereign authority over territory last held by the Oneidas 200 years ago.").	Approximately five years later, in <i>Oneida</i> , the Second Circuit addressed a dispute that flowed from the Supreme Court's decision in <i>Sherrill</i> . Specifically, in the wake of <i>Sherrill's</i> holding that the property recently purchased	held that the Oneidas' property was subject to taxation, as well as to "local zoning or other regulatory controls," it did not explicitly hold that the City of Sherrill could sue the Oneidas to collect unpaid taxes.	Appendix B property which had been part of the Oneida's reservation, but which had been sold, and then re-purchased by the Oneidas on the open market: In this action, [the Oneida Indian Nation] seeks declaratory and injunctive relief recognizing its present and future sovereign immunity from local taxation on parcels of land the Tribe purchased in the open market, properties that had been subject to state and local taxation for generations. We now reject th[at] unification theory and hold that standards [of federal Indian law and federal equity practice preclude the Tribe from rekindling embers of sovereignty that long ago grew cold. ⁴	13a

Appendix B

by the Oneidas was subject to taxation, Madison County and Oneida County attempted to collect unpaid taxes from the Oneidas, by foreclosing on the properties. The Oneidas responded by seeking an injunction in federal [district court, enjoining the foreclosure actions, on the grounds of tribal sovereign immunity from suit. The district court granted summary judgment on that basis for the Oneidas, and the Second Circuit Panel affirmed that ruling, stating: "We affirm on the ground that the [Oneida Indian Nation] is immune from suit under the long-standing doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. The remedy of foreclosure is therefore not available to the Counties." *Id.*, 605 F.3d at 151.

In that regard, the Second Circuit discussed the difference between "two distinct doctrines: tribal sovereign authority over reservation lands and tribal The Court specifically from suit." *Oneida*, 605 F.3d at 156. The Court specifically stated that *Sherrill* involved only the former doctrine, and not the latter. That is, the Circuit Panel held that *Sherrill* merely authorized the imposition of taxes on the Oneida's properties, but did not authorize the taxing counties to take legal action to collect the taxes:

[W]e do not read *Sherrill* as implicitly abrogating the [Oneidas'] immunity from suit. No such statement of abrogation was made by the *Sherrill* Court, nor does the opinion call into question the *Kiowa* Court's approach, [that any such abrogation should be left to Congress. *Sherrill* dealt with the right to demand compliance with state laws. It did not address the means available to enforce those laws.

Appendix B

Id. at 157-159 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Although the Second Circuit Panel agreed with the Counties, "that the notion that they may tax but not foreclose is inconsistent and contradictory," it nevertheless concluded that the foreclosure actions had to be enjoined, since Congress had not authorized them, and since the Oneidas had not waived their sovereign immunity. *Id.* at 159.

In a concurring opinion in *Oneida*, Judge Cabranes removed any possible doubt as to the meaning of the Panel's decision:

The holding in this case comes down to this: an Indian tribe can purchase land (including land that was never part of a reservation); refuse to pay lawfully-owed taxes; and suffer no consequences because the taxing authority cannot sue to collect the taxes owed. This rule of decision defies common sense. But absent action by our highest Court, or by Congress, it is the law.

Id. at 163 (footnote omitted); *see also, id.* at 164 (Indicating that the Panel's ruling was required by "unambiguous guidance from the Supreme Court," but calling upon the Supreme Court, or Congress, to correct the "anomalous" result and "reunite" "law and logic.").

The county defendants in *Oneida* petitioned for writ of certiorari, and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeal. However, in an eleventh-hour tactical move, the

Appendix B

Oneidas avoided review by belatedly agreeing to waive sovereign immunity. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the action to the Second Circuit for further action in light of the Oneidas' waiver. See, Madison County, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 131 the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions, on grounds unrelated to the issue of sovereign immunity from suit. Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. Madison County, 665 F.3d 408 (2d Cir. 2011).

Against the backdrop of these cases, Defendant maintains that it is entitled to foreclose on the Cayugas' properties, and asks this Court to issue a ruling that is directly contrary to the Second Circuit's ruling in *Oneida*. Defendant maintains that the *Oneida* decision has no force, since it was vacated by the Supreme Court. However, the Court disagrees. Although the Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit's ruling, it did not do the Second Circuit would reach a different decision today. To the contrary, Judges Cabranes' concurring opinion, which Judge Hall joined, indicated that the Panel's ruling Supreme Court," which has not changed.

Defendant nevertheless insists that Oneida was wrongly decided. According to Defendant, Sherrill necessarily held that the Oneidas could not invoke sovereign immunity from suit to avoid the collection of the disputed property taxes. On this point, in Sherrill, the Supreme Court stated:

17a

Appendix B

[G]iven the longstanding, distinctly non-Indian character of the area and its inhabitants, the regulatory authority constantly exercised by New York State and its counties and towns, and the Oneida's long delay in seeking judicial relief against parties other than the United States, we hold that the Tribe *cannot unilaterally revive its ancient sovereignty, <u>in whole or in part</u>, over the parcels at issue.*

Sherrill, 125 S.Ct. at 1483 (emphasis added). Defendant argues that pursuant to Sherrill, an Indian tribe that purchases real property that may have previously been Reservation land is treated no differently than any non-Indian land owner with regard to that property.

At least one district court in this Circuit has agreed with Defendant on this point. In *New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation*, 523 F.Supp.2d 185, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), which did not involve property taxes, the district court interpreted *Sherrill* as permitting a lawsuit against the Oneidas to collect the unpaid taxes:

[I]t is clear from the Supreme Court's decision in *Sherrill* that a tribe can be prevented from invoking a defense of sovereign immunity where equitable doctrines preclude the tribe from asserting sovereignty over a particular parcel of land. <u>In other words, the *Sherrill* Court held</u> that the [Oneidas] could not invoke sovereign immunity to defend against local real property tax enforcement proceedings, including eviction

Appendix B

equitable right to prevent. the Supreme Court clearly stated they have the the courts to avoid the disruptive impact that here would be left utterly powerless to utilize defendants are immune from suit, plaintiffs undermine the holding of Sherrill because, if that land. To hold otherwise would completely from asserting sovereignty with respect to <u>of land if equitable principles prevent the tribe</u> <u>case, to enforce its laws with respect to a parcel</u> <u>be sued by a state or town, such as the instant</u> or defensive). Thus. Sherrill allows a tribe to territorial sovereign status whether affirmative (Souter, J., concurring) (rejecting claim of disagree."); see also id. at 221, 125 S.Ct. 1478 in the eviction proceeding against Sherrill. We the Tribe may assert tax immunity defensively suggests that, compatibly with today's decision, See id. at 214 n. 7, 125 S.Ct. 1478 ("The dissent opinion specifically [rejected that reasoning. Id. at 225, 125 S.Ct. 1478. However, the majority a defense against a state collection proceeding." dissent that tribal immunity could be raised "as Specifically, ... Justice Stevens argued in his proceedings. 544 U.S. at 211, 125 S.Ct. 1478.

25, 2012). Shinnecock Indian Nation, 686 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. Jun. addressing the merits of the ruling. See, New York v. Shinnecock for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, without subsequently vacated the district court's decision in (emphasis added). However, the Second Circuit

19a

Appendix B

233, 904 N.Y.S.2d 312 (2010), the Court of Appeals made interpreted Sherrill as permitting lawsuits against the following observation about the Sherrill decision: Nation v. Gould, 14 N.Y.3d 614, 640, 642-643, 930 N.E.2d on the open market. In that regard, in Cayuga Indian property taxes on properties that were recently bought the Oneidas, and, by extension, the Cayugas, to collect The New York Court of Appeals has also seemingly

obligation to pay real property taxes on the sovereign authority relieving the tribe of the reacquired parcels. lands resulted in the reassertion of that tribe's Indian Nation that its repurchase of aboriginal impossibility to bar a claim by the Oneida the doctrines of laches, acquiescence and In City of Sherrill, the Supreme Court applied

properties for the purpose of avoiding real sovereign power over its convenience store property taxes[.] City of Sherrill certainly would preclude the Cayuga Nation from attempting to assert

benefit of guidance from the Second Circuit, it might (emphasis added) Consequently, if this Court were writing without the

well have been inclined to agree that Sherrill's broad language bars the Cayugas from asserting <u>any</u> sovereign

Appendix B

suit is inherently tied to its ability to exercise at least the Cayugas' ability to claim sovereign immunity from the Reservation.⁵ This argument seems to admit that been disestablished, but not as to properties outside within the Reservation, which it maintains has never from suit as to foreclosure actions against properties words, Plaintiff maintains that it has sovereign immunity as established by the Treaty of Canandaigua. In other the geographic boundary of the Cayuga Reservation claims such immunity with regard to its property within that it owns, regardless of location, but instead, only against tax foreclosure proceedings on all real property the Tribe does not claim to have sovereign immunity interesting. Specifically, Plaintiff's counsel indicated that authority involving the recently-purchased parcels, including sovereign immunity from suit. See, Sherrill, Plaintiff's statements at oral argument to be particularly parcels at issue."). On this point, the Court finds one of its ancient sovereignty, in whole or in part, over the 125 S.Ct. at 1483 ("[T]he tribe cannot unilaterally revive

Appendix B

some amount of sovereign authority over the land. This position, though, does not appear helpful to Plaintiff, since, according to *Sherrill*, the Cayugas cannot assert any sovereign authority over the recently-purchased land, "in whole or in part," due to equitable considerations, even though it may lie within the Reservation.

Accordingly, there is some persuasive force to Defendant's argument that Plaintiff cannot assert sovereign immunity from suit involving the subject properties, based upon the same practical and equitable considerations that drove the *Sherrill* decision. However, for the reasons stated above, the Court will follow the Second Circuit's ruling in *Oneida*, which, although technically without effect after being vacated, clearly rejects Defendant's argument.

Defendant nevertheless argues that the Second Circuit's *Oneida* decision is erroneous because it failed to consider that the subject foreclosure actions are *in rem* proceedings, to which, Defendant argues, tribal sovereign immunity from suit does not apply. However, in the district court decision that was on appeal in *Oneida*, Judge Hurd expressly rejected the same argument by Madison County, that tribal sovereign immunity from suit did not apply to *in rem* foreclosure actions: "The County cannot circumvent Tribal sovereign immunity by characterizing the suit as *in rem*, when it is, in actuality, a suit to take the tribe's property." *Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. Madison County*, 401 F.Supp.2d 219, 229 (N.D.N.Y. 2005). On appeal to the Second Circuit, the county defendants again argued that the Oneidas'

^{5.} On this point, Plaintiff curiously seems to claim less sovereign immunity from suit than it could have, pursuant to Oneida, since in that case, the Second Circuit indicated that sovereign immunity from suit applied even to foreclosure actions involving property that was never part of an Indian reservation. See, Oneida, 605 F.3d at 163 ("[A]n Indian tribe can purchase land (including land that was never part of a reservation); refuse to pay lawfully-owed taxes; and suffer no consequences because the taxing authority cannot sue to collect the taxes owed.") (emphasis added) (Cabranes, J., concurring opinion). Plaintiff 's position also seems inconsistent with the statement in Oneida that the doctrines of tribal sovereign authority over tribal land and sovereign immunity from suit are entirely distinct.

Appendix B

tribal immunity from suit did not apply in an *in rem* tax for closure proceeding. *See*, Brief and Special Appendix for Defendants-Counterclaimants-Appellants, 2007 WL 6432637 at pp. 58 [("*Yakima* and other cases make it clear that any sovereignty possessed by a tribe *qua* tribe is irrelevant in an *in rem* tax foreclosure proceeding.") & 60 ("It is clear from *Sherrill* and *Yakima* that different standards govern Indian claims of sovereign immunity, depending on whether there is a claim against the tribe itself, or a claim against land owned by the tribe that is not sovereign Indian country. This central distinction is rooted in the limited nature of an *in rem* action, which looks only to the property for relief.") (footnote omitted).

As already discussed, though, the Second Circuit disagreed with the Counties' arguments, and specifically found that the foreclosure actions were barred by the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity from suit. *See, Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. Madison County and Oneida County*, 605 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2010). Although the Panel did not discuss Defendant's argument about *in rem* proceedings in the decision, it obviously considered and rejected it. Accordingly, the Court need not revisit that issue.

To the extent that Defendant's argument on this point relies upon the Supreme Court's decision in *County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation*, 502 U.S. 251, 112 S.Ct 683, 116 L. Ed. 2d 687 (1992), the Court disagrees that the case stands for the proposition that tribal sovereign immunity from suit is inapplicable to *in rem* proceedings. *Yakima* involved the State of Washington's ability to tax certain "fee patent"

Appendix B

parcels of land, located within the Yakima Reservation, that had become alienable under the General Allotment Act. *Yakima's* use of the terms *in rem* and *in personam* pertained to the difference between the *imposition*, not collection, of taxes on a piece of land, as opposed to an individual. The Supreme Court concluded that Yakima County had the power to impose an ad valorem tax on the land, pursuant to an express grant from Congress, but not the ability to impose an excise tax on sellers of the land. Admittedly, the *Yakima* decision did refer in passing to the "power to assess and collect a tax on certain real estate." *Id.*, 112 S.Ct. at 692 (emphasis added). However, that statement appears to be dicta, since the *Yakima* decision did not involve tribal sovereign immunity from suit.

Defendant next contends that the Cayuga Nation waived any sovereign immunity from suit to which it may be entitled, by paying taxes on some properties. However, a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity must be "clear." *Oklahoma Tax Com'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma*, 498 U.S. 505, 509, 111 S.Ct. 905, 909, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1112 (1991) ("Suits against Indian tribes are thus barred by sovereign immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation.") (citation omitted). The Cayugas' payment of taxes on certain parcels of property does not amount to such a waiver.

Finally, Defendant argues that the Cayugas should be estopped from claiming sovereign immunity from suit, since, in a separate action before the New York Court of Appeals, they indicated that they were paying property taxes on their lands. *See, Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Gould*, 14 N.Y.3d at 642, n. 11 ("The Cayuga Indian

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Nation acknowledges its obligation to pay real property taxes and comply with local zoning and land use laws on these parcels and it is undisputed that the Nation has, to date, fulfilled those obligations."). However, that language from the *Gould* decision referred specifically to the two "convenience store properties," one in Cayuga County and one in Seneca County, that were the subject of that decision, not to all tribe-owned parcels that had been purchased on the open market. Accordingly, [the Cayugas are not estopped from claiming sovereign immunity from suit merely because they acknowledged that they were paying taxes on parcels unrelated to this action.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated that the subject foreclosure actions are barred by the Tribe's sovereign immunity from suit, and that it is therefore entitled to preliminary injunctive relief.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff's application for preliminary injunctive relief [#4] is granted.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 20, 2012 Rochester, New York

<u>/s/</u> CHARLES J. SIRAGUSA United States District Judge

24a